Question

an oligopoly market structure where the firms select a quantity of output and assumes rivals will...

an oligopoly market structure where the firms select a quantity of output and assumes rivals will not react is

A) Cournot

B) Chamberlin

C) Stackelberg

D) Bertrand

Homework Answers

Answer #1

It is in the Cournot model of oligopoly that it is assumed that each firm makes its output decision in independent and simultaneous manner.

In other words, in this market, each firm assumes that other firm will keep its output at fixed level and whatever level of output it decides to produce, rival firms will not react.

So,

It can be stated that an oligopoly market structure where the firms select a quantity of output and assumes rivals will not react is Cournot.

Hence, the correct answer is the option (A).

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