Question

24. Two players are engaged in a game of Chicken. There are two possible strategies: swerve...


24. Two players are engaged in a game of Chicken. There are two possible strategies: swerve and drive straight. A player who swerves is called Chicken and gets a payoff of zero, regardless of what the other player does. A player who drives straight gets a payoff of 432 if the other player swerves and a payoff of −48 if the other player also drives straight. This game has two pure strategy equilibria and
a. a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.10 and drives straight with probability 0.90.
b. a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.05 and drives straight with probability 0.95. c. a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.10 and the other swerves with probability 0.90.
d. two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight.

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