Question

B small large small X,Y 132,166 A large 162,135 141,139 6. Consider Figure 2. Let X...

B
small large
small X,Y 132,166
A
large 162,135 141,139

6. Consider Figure 2. Let X = 150 and Y = 140. In this game, what is the Nash equilibrium?

(a.) Both choose small

(b.) Both choose large

(c.) A chooses small and B chooses large

(d.) A chooses large and B chooses small

Homework Answers

Answer #1

With the given values of X and Y, there is a dominant strategy for both the players in selecting large. The payoff received from selecting large by both the players is greater than the payoff from selecting small. For player A this gives a choice between 150 and 162 when player B select small and 132 and 141 when she select large. Clearly, large becomes the dominant strategy for player A as well as for player B

Nash equilibrium is therefore selecting large by both players. Option B is correct.

Know the answer?
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for?
Ask your own homework help question
Similar Questions
B red white red X,Y 4,13 A white 12,8 6,Z 4. Consider Figure 1. Say that...
B red white red X,Y 4,13 A white 12,8 6,Z 4. Consider Figure 1. Say that X = 14, Y = 14 and Z = 8. The game has ____ Nash equilibrium. (a.) zero (b.) one (c.) two (d.) three
B red white red X,Y 4,13 A white 12,8 6,Z 3. Consider Figure 1. Say that...
B red white red X,Y 4,13 A white 12,8 6,Z 3. Consider Figure 1. Say that X = 13, Y = 16 and Z = 6. In this case, player B’s best response to A playing red is ____ and B’s best response to A playing white is ____. (a.) Red; red (b.) Red; white (c.) White; red (d.) White; white
Consider the following game. Player 1’s payoffs are listed first, in bold:                        Player 2 X...
Consider the following game. Player 1’s payoffs are listed first, in bold:                        Player 2 X Y Player 1 U 100 , 6   800 , 4 M 0 , 0 200 , 1 D 10 , 20 20 , 20 Imagine that Player 1 makes a decision first and Player 2 makes a decision after observing Player 1’s choice. Write down every subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. Does the outcome above differ from the Nash equilibrium (if the game...
Consider a game where two 6-sided dice are rolled. - Let X be the minimum of...
Consider a game where two 6-sided dice are rolled. - Let X be the minimum of the two dice - Let Y be the sum of the two dice - Let Z be the first die minus the second die. Write out the distributions of X, Y, and Z, respectively.
Consider the following game: Two firms simultaneously decide whether or not to enter a market. Each...
Consider the following game: Two firms simultaneously decide whether or not to enter a market. Each firm must pay a fixed entry cost of c if it decides to enter. After making their entry decisions, each firm observes whether or not its rival entered, and then chooses a production level. If both firms enter, production levels are chosen simultaneously. Market demand is given by p(q) = 8 − Q, where Q is the total market production. If a firm enters...
1. Let f (x, y) = xy((x^2-y^2)/(x^2+y^2)) if, (x, y) 6= (0, 0), 0, if (x,...
1. Let f (x, y) = xy((x^2-y^2)/(x^2+y^2)) if, (x, y) 6= (0, 0), 0, if (x, y) = (0, 0) (it's written as a piecewise function) (a) Compute ∂f/∂y (0, 0) and ∂f/∂x (0, 0). (b) Compute ∂f/∂y (x, 0) for all x, and ∂f/∂x (0, y) for all y (c) Use part (a) and (b) to compute ∂^2f/∂y∂x (0, 0) and ∂^2f/ ∂x∂y (0, 0), then verify that: ∂^2f/∂y∂x (0, 0) does not equal ∂^f/ ∂x∂y (0, 0)
Let t and s be transformations of the plane such that t(x, y) = (x+a, y+b)...
Let t and s be transformations of the plane such that t(x, y) = (x+a, y+b) and s(x, y) = (x+c, y+d) where a, b, c, and d are Real numbers. Let ?(?1, ?1) and ?(?2, ?2) be any two points in the plane. Show that (s ◦ t)(x, y) is an isometry.
Let X and Y have the joint pdf f(x,y) = 6*(x^2)*y for 0 <= x <=...
Let X and Y have the joint pdf f(x,y) = 6*(x^2)*y for 0 <= x <= y and x + y <= 2. What is the marginal pdf of X and Y? What is P(Y < 1.1 | X = 0.6)? Are X and Y dependent random variables?
6. Let d= X -Y, where X and Y are random variables with normal distribution, and...
6. Let d= X -Y, where X and Y are random variables with normal distribution, and X and Y are independent random variables. Assume that you know both the mean and variance of   X and Y, if you have random samples from X and Y with equal sample size, what is the sampling distribution for the sample means of d(assuming X and Y are independent)?
Use the following information is answering questions 1 - 11. Assume the demand in a market...
Use the following information is answering questions 1 - 11. Assume the demand in a market is given by Q = 100 - 2P and that MC = AC = 10. Assume there are two sellers whose strategy is to choose a quantity and that seller 1 chooses first and seller 2 chooses second. Assume this game is repeated an infinite number of times. 1. The Stackelberg equilibrium in this market is for firm 1 to produce ____ and firm...