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The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 154 – 3(Q1 +...

The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 154 – 3(Q1 + Q2) and costs are Company 1,  C1(Q1) = 10Q1 and Company 2 C2(Q2) = 18Q2.

Calculate the equilibrium output for Company 2

Round all calculations to 1 decimal

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