Question

Reference the following information about the market demand function for questions 1 to 15. These questions...

Reference the following information about the market demand function for questions 1 to 15.

These questions are on different types of market structures – monopoly, perfect competition, Cournot oligopoly market, and the Stackelberg oligopoly market. The market demand function is given the following equation: P = 1600 – Q where Q is the industry’s output level. Suppose initially this market is served by a single firm. Let the total cost function of this firm be given the function C(Q) = 80Q. The firm’s marginal cost of production (MC) is equal to the firm’s average cost (AC): MC = AC = 80.

13) What will be the market price in this Stackelberg market?

14)Can you calculate the profit earned by the Stackelberg leader and the Stackelberg follower?

15) Can you identify the results we learned from solving this problem on market structure?

Homework Answers

Know the answer?
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for?
Ask your own homework help question
Similar Questions
The market demand function is Q=10,000-1,000p. Each firm has a marginal cost of m=$0.16. Firm 1,...
The market demand function is Q=10,000-1,000p. Each firm has a marginal cost of m=$0.16. Firm 1, the leader, acts before Firm 2, the follower. Solve for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits. Compare your solution to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities are: q1=___________ units and q2=____________units The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium price is: p=$_____________ Profits for the firms are profit1=$_______________ and profit2=$_______________ The Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities are: q1=______________units and q2=______________units The Cournot-Nash equilibrium price is: p=$______________ Profits for the...
Given the Inverse Demand function as P = 1000-(Q1+Q2) and Cost Function of firms as Ci(Qi)...
Given the Inverse Demand function as P = 1000-(Q1+Q2) and Cost Function of firms as Ci(Qi) = 4Qi calculate the following values. A. In a Cournot Oligopoly (PC, QC, πC) i. Find the Price (Pc) in the market, ii. Find the profit maximizing output (Qi*) and iii. Find the Profit (πiC) of each firm. B. In a Stackelberg Oligopoly (PS, QS, πS), i. Find the Price (PS) in the market, ii. Find the profit maximizing output of the Leader (QL*)...
1) Suppose the monopoly has broken up into two separate companies. The demand function is P=105-3Q....
1) Suppose the monopoly has broken up into two separate companies. The demand function is P=105-3Q. The firms do not collude and the firms have identical marginal cost functions (MC1=MC2=40.). Also assume they are Cournot duopolists. Determine the quantity and price of each firm. Quantity for firm 1: ________ Quantity for firm 2: ________ Price in each market: $_________ 2) Now assume these firms are acting like Bertrand duopolists. What quantity will each firm produce and what will be the...
Suppose a drug manufacturer sells a new drug for twitchy feet. The market demand curve for...
Suppose a drug manufacturer sells a new drug for twitchy feet. The market demand curve for the drug is P=105-3Q, where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity. Also suppose the marginal cost for manufacturing is 40/ unit. C) Suppose the monopoly has broken up into two separate companies. The demand function is still P=105-3Q as part A. The firms do not collude and the firms have identical marginal cost functions (MC1=MC2=40.). Also assume they are...
Suppose a drug manufacturer sells a new drug for twitchy feet. The market demand curve for...
Suppose a drug manufacturer sells a new drug for twitchy feet. The market demand curve for the drug is P=110-2Q, where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity. Also suppose the marginal cost for manufacturing is 10/ unit. A) Assuming the firm is an unregulated monopolist, what quantity and price should the firm offer? Quantity =. Price = $ B) Now suppose, the manufacturer has identified two separate classifications of cusC) Suppose the monopoly has broken...
Consider a market with 2 identical firms (a and b). The market demand is P =...
Consider a market with 2 identical firms (a and b). The market demand is P = 14 - Q where Q = Qa + Qb. For both firms AC=MC= 2. A. Solve for the Cournot-Nash reaction functions of each firm. B. Solve for the Cournot- Nash equilibrium. Solve for Q, Qa, Qb, Price, and each firms profit. C. Compare the Cournot-Nash equilibrium with perfect competition, and monopoly (you can refer to your results from question 2, if you’ve already done...
Consider a market with 2 identical firms (a and b). The market demand is P =...
Consider a market with 2 identical firms (a and b). The market demand is P = 14 - Q where Q = Qa + Qb. For both firms AC=MC= 2. A. Solve for the Cournot-Nash reaction functions of each firm. B. Solve for the Cournot- Nash equilibrium. Solve for Q, Qa, Qb, Price, and each firms profit. C. Compare the Cournot-Nash equilibrium with perfect competition, and monopoly (you can refer to your results from question 2, if you’ve already done...
Question 4 Consider the following game. Firm 1, the leader, selects an output, q1, after which...
Question 4 Consider the following game. Firm 1, the leader, selects an output, q1, after which firm 2, the follower, observes the choice of q1 and then selects its own output, q2. The resulting price is one satisfying the industry demand curve P = 200 - q1 - q2. Both firms have zero fixed costs and a constant marginal cost of $60. a. Derive the equation for the follower firm’s best response function. Draw this equation on a diagram with...
1. Consider a market with inverse demand P (Q) = 100 Q and two firms with...
1. Consider a market with inverse demand P (Q) = 100 Q and two firms with cost function C(q) = 20q. (A) Find the Stackelberg equilibrium outputs, price and total profits (with firm 1 as the leader). (B) Compare total profits, consumer surplus and social welfare under Stackelberg and Cournot (just say which is bigger). (C) Are the comparisons intuitively expected? 2. Consider the infinite repetition of the n-firm Bertrand game. Find the set of discount factors for which full...
Suppose a drug manufacturer sells a new drug for twitchy feet. The market demand curve for...
Suppose a drug manufacturer sells a new drug for twitchy feet. The market demand curve for the drug is P=120-4Q, where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity. Also suppose the marginal cost for manufacturing is 20/ unit. A) Assuming the firm is an unregulated monopolist, what quantity and price should the firm offer? Quantity = Price = B) Now suppose, the manufacturer has identified two separate classifications of customers for their twitchy feet product. Because...