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N firms are competing by producing the same product. The quantity of production by firm i...

N firms are competing by producing the same product. The quantity of production by firm i is denoted by qi . Each firm chooses the quantity (any positive number) without knowing the other firms’ choices. The profit of each firm depends on the market price and the cost of production. The market price is given by P=100-∑qi, and the cost of producing quantity qi is C(qi)=40qi. When N=1, it is the case of monopoly. What is the optimal quantity of production? What about for N=2?

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