Question

The next two questions will refer to the following game table: Player 2 X Y A...

The next two questions will refer to the following game table:

Player 2
X Y
A 2, 3 6, 1
Player 1 B 4, 2 1, 3
C 3, 1 2, 4

Question1

Which of Player 1's pure strategies is non-rationalizable, in a mixed-strategy context?

Group of answer choices

A

B

C

Question2

Using your answer to the previous question, find all of this game's mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.

*If you used graphs to help you answer the previous question and you would like me to consider them.

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