Suppose that the NFL and the NFL Players Association are negotiating on a new collective bargaining agreement. Each side has the options to either be mean or be nice in negotiations. Suppose we model the game as a simultaneous move game, depicted in the game box below. Note: The payoffs below are depicted as: (NFL payoff, Players Association payoff)
The Players Association |
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Be Mean |
Be Nice |
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The NFL |
Be Mean |
15, 0 |
20, 10 |
|
Be Nice |
10, 20 |
30, 15 |
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a. What, if any, are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria? What are the payoffs for each side in the Nash equilibria?
b. Suppose this game were instead modeled as a sequential move game. Would there be first-mover advantage or second-mover advantage?
c. Assume that the Players Association moves first in the sequential version of this game. Is “Be Mean” a credible threat for the NFL? Why or why not?
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