Question

For the weighted voting system [19 : 10, 6, 2, 1], which of the following Statements...

For the weighted voting system [19 : 10, 6, 2, 1], which of the following Statements are true? Statement 1: The 10-weight voter is a dictator. Statement 2: The 1-weight voter has veto power.

Homework Answers

Answer #1

both 1&2 statements are false

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